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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Adoption of:
JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT,

Case No. 15272

a minor.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

On the lOth day of February, 1977, a final Decree of Adoption
was entered in the above entitled matter by the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. E.
BANKS, Judge presiding.

Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside the

Decree of Adoption and that motion was heard on the lOth day of March,
1977, at which time the Court took the motion under advisement,
pending further testimony.

On the 25th day of March, 1977, after hear-

ing testimony of both the natural mother and the Appellant, the Court
entered an Order setting aside the final Decree of Adoption previously
granted.

Further testimony then was taken on the 25th day of March,

1977, concerning the question of abandonment by the Appellant and as
to the facts concerning conception of the minor child who is the subject of these adoption proceedings.

Subsequently, on the 6th day of

May, 1977, and the 1st day of June, 1977, Orders and a Decree of Adoption
in these proceedings were granted to DEE R. MARSDEN, the husband of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Llie natural mother
of the
child,Act,the
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1.

The Appellant had never acquired any parental rights

in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT; and
2.

In the event he had acquired any parental rights,

the same were terminated on the grounds of his abandonment.
Appellant appeals from that Judgment granting the adoption.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On March 11, 1973, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT was born in Salt LakE
City, Utah, to SHERRIE LYlW

~~IGHT,

an unmarried 14-year-old girl.

now SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT MARSDEN,

The Appellant, JOHN WAYNE COX, was

23 years old at the time of that birth.

All doctor and hospital ex-

pense arisin> •'u" of the birth of JASON MICHAEL I.JRIGHT were paid by
SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT'S parents and the Appellant did not contribute to
the payment of any bills incurred by the birth of JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT.
Subsequent to the birth of said child, JOHN WAYNE COX spent a short
period of time in the United States Marine Corps; and while in the
corps and stationed overseas, Mr. COX sent flowers to SHERRIE LYNN
WRIGHT and wrote several letters to her.

These letters were limited

to inquires about SHERRIE; no inquiry was every made as to the health
and welfare of JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT.

After leaving the military,

JOHN WAYNE COX returned to Salt Lake City, Utah, in early 1974; and,
in the three years thdt have elapsed since that time, JOHN WAYNE COX
has contacted SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT only on one occasion, and that for
the purpose of inquiring as to her personal welfare; and has contribute
no monies towards the support of
On October 26, 1974, SHERRIE LYNN

JASO~

NICHAEL l.JRIGHT in over three ye

h~IC:HT

married DEER.

nARSDE~,

the
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with JASON MICHAEL \•!RIGHT and a second child born to DEE R. and
SHERRIE MARSDEN.

On December 8, 1976, DEE R. MARSDEN filed a Pe-

tition for Adoption of JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT.

The final Decree of

Adoption was entered in this matter on the 1st day of June, 1977.

ARGUMENT:
POINT I:

That the District Court properly applied the law in ruling
that JOHN WAYNE COX never acquired any rights by being the fater,
either by statute and/or by common law.
The criminal statute which applied at the time that JOHN
WAYNE COX took sexual liberties with SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT is
U.C.A., 1953, as amended.

S 76-53-19,

That statute was construed and interpreted

in STATE v. HUNTSMAN, 115 Utah 283; 204 P.2d 448, as fixing the age
of consent.

The Court indicated that, where a statute makes it

either rape or carnal knowledge to have illicit sexual intercourse
with a female under a specified age without any provision regarding
her consent, such statute fixes the age of consent.

The Court

further stated that the purpose of such statute establishing the age
of consent is to protect young girls from illicit acts of the
opposite sex.

STATE v. HUNTSMAN, supra.

The next preceding statute,

S 76-53-18,

U.C.A., 1953,

as amended, states:
Penalty.-Rape is punishable as follows:
(3) When the female upon whom the act is committed is
under the age of thirteen years, by imprisonment in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(b) In all other cases, by imprisonment in the state
prison not less than ten years.

There was given a definition of rape in U.C.A., 1953,
as amended,

S 76-53-15,

as follows:

"Rape" defined.~Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female, not the wife of the
perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:
(1) When the female is under the age of thirteen years.
(2) When she is incapable, through lunacy or any
other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent.
(3) Where she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force or violence.
(4) Where she is prevented from resisting by threats
of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by
apparent power of execution, or by any intoxicating,
narcotic or anesthetic substance administered by or
with the privity of thE
~cused.
(5) When she is at th
le unconscious of the nature
of the act, and this
~wn to the accused.
(6) Wheorc she submits Jnder the belief that the person
committing the act is her husband, and this belief is
induced by any artificate, pretense or concealment
practiced by the accused with the intent to induce
such belief.
Utah, therefore, had a rather unusual grouping of sex
offenses which provided for two degrees of statutory rape; the
first being defined specifically as rape where it occurred under
any of the circumstances described in

S 76-53-15,

supra; and the

second, called carnal knowledge, when it occurred under any
th~

circumstances specified in

~

76-53-19, supra.

stance, the age of consent was 18 years.

of

In either in-

Prior to the age of

18, a woman was not deemed to be able to consent to any act of
illicit sexual intercourse.

STATE \'. HUNTSHAN, supra.

In 65 ArnJur 2d, Rape, ~ 19, it is stated, "1n jurisdicSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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course with any female without indicating whether the absence of marriage is or is not an essential element of the offense.

It has been

held that the fact that the female was married or had been married did
not make her capable of legally consenting to the sexual act; and, thus,
her marriage is no defense to the crime of statutory rape committed
by another than her husband if she is under the age of 18.

STATE v.

HUNTSMAN, supra.
Basically, what our legislature has done is to create two
levels or degrees of statutory rape; that upon a child under the age
of 13 and that upon a child between the ages of 13 and 18, setting
different penalties for each.

The mere fact that the legislature

had designated the second as a crime of carnal knowledge made it no
less a case of statutory rape.

Thus, when JOHN WAYNE COX had illicit

sexual intercourse with SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT, he committed an act of
statutory rape as defined by the statutes.
The Appellant cites a number of cases in support of his
proposition that Appellant acquired parental rights in and to the child,
citing STANLEY v. ILLINOIS 405 U.S. 645, 31 LED 2nd 551, 9 U.S. Ct.
1208 (1972), and STATE, IN THE INTEREST OF M, 25 U.2d, 101, 476 P.2d
1013 (1970), and the change in the§ 78-30-4 U.C.A., 1953, as cited
in THO~~S v. CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF OGDEN, 12 U 2d 235, 364 P.2d
1029 (1961).

But the issue presented herein is not merely one of

whether the father of an illegitimate child acquires any parental
rights in and to that child, but more clearly the question of whether
any man, guilty of raping a woman, acquires rights in an child which
he hds,

through this illicit act, created.

The Utah State Legislature

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thus, it is a question which must be resolved by looking to the
common law.

If the child was illegitimate under the common law,

the mother was the sole legal parent and all the rights of parenthood invested in her and her alone.

Although this issue is not

treated in our statutes, nor in the texts, it is the belief of
the Respondent that to invest in a rapist any parental rights
would result in a gross miscarriage of justice.

It would be

equivalent to saying that a thief acquired rights in rhe property
that he steals from another.
This Court, in THOMAS v CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF OGDEN,
supra, stated:

The putative father of an illegitimate child occupies
no recognized parental status at common law or under
our statutes.
The law does not recognize him at all
except that i~ will make him pay for the child's maintenance if it can find out whn he is. The only father
it recognizes as having any rights is the father of a
legitimate child.

Thus, this Court adopted the common law standard that the father
of an illegitimate child acquired no rights in that child.

While

the statutes have been amended to grant certain limited rights to
fathers of illegitimate children, nowhere in our statutes have
those rights been extended to include a person, who through rape,
causes the conception of a child.
In 1975, the Utah Legislature amended § 78-30-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the chapter on Adoption, to provide as follows:

A person who ... claims to be the father of an illegitimate
child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of
the child by registering with the Bureau of Vital StCJtisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Notwithstanding the contention of Appellant's counsel that the Utah
Legislature wants to protect the rights of the fathers of illegitimate
children, it is clear that the legislature's intent in amending
§ 78-30-4 was to limit and restrict the rights of such fathers to
complaint about adoption proceedings, requiring them to file a notice
of their claim of paternity in order to even be entitled to a notice
of the impending adoption hearing.

This statute does not create in

such a father any right to custody or even a right to visitation.
Conversely, it places certain obligations on the father that must be
met before he is entitled to claim rights, if any, to the child or
to notice of an adoption hearing.

If the father fails to file his

claim of paternity with the State, he is absolutely precluded from
claiming any rights to the child or from contesting the prospective
adoption.
It is clear, therefore, that the Appellant, JOHN WAYNE
COX, having impregnated SHERRIE LYNN MARSDEN through an act of carnal
knowledge, a crime equivalent to statutory rape, acquired no rights to
the child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT.

No such rights were recognized in

common law and no such rights have been created by our State Legislature.

To rule otherwise would be to say that this man, who did the

wrong thing at the wrong time with the wrong person, should be rewarded
with the joys and pleasures ordinarily reserved to the law abiding
segment of our society.

POINT II:

The District Court further correctly ruled that even in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT; he "abandoned the child
and forfeited any rights that he may have had."
The standard which the Court followed in this lawsuit
is set out in§ 78-30-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows:

Adoption of deserted child.-A child deserted by its
parent or parents, and having no legal guardian, may be
adopted as in this chapter provided, without the consent
of the parent or parents having deserted said child,
when the district court in which the proceedings are
pending shall determine that such child has been deserted
by its parent or parents.
Notice of proceedings for the
determination of the fact of desertion shall be by
personal service, publication, or posting as the court
may direct and deem most likely to give notice to the
parent or parents, and the court may require such further notice of the proceedings to be given to the kindred of said child as may appear to be just and
practicable.

Our State Legislature, seeing that desertion is difficult to prove,
has amended that statute effective May 10, 1977, to read as
follows:

Consent unnecessary where parents fail to support or communicate with child.-A child may be adopted without the consent
of the parent or parents, when the district court in which
the proceedings are pending determines, after notice to such
parent or parents in a manner determined by the court, that
the parent or parents, having the ability and duty to do
so, have not provided support and have made no effort or
only token effort without good cause to maintain a parental
relationship with the child.
It is a rebuttable presumption
that no effort has been made if the parent or parents have
failed to support and communicate with the child for a period
of one year or longer.

Thus, the Legislature has amended the adoption statute to comply
with the judicial interpretions of other State Supreme Courts.
CLAUNCH v. ENTREKIN,

(Alabama) 128

See

S. 2d 100; LANKFORD v. HOLLINGS-
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540 P.2d 741; PETITION OF MARTINSON, (Colorado) 267 P.2d 658; KARKANEN
v. VALDESUSO, (Colorado) 515 P.2d 128; RE: ADOPTION OF LAYTON, (Florida)
196 S.2d 784; PETITION OF MILLER, 15 Ill.App.2d 333, 146 N.E.2d
226; RE: ADOPTION OF HERBST, 217 Kans. 164, 535 P.2d 437; RE: CARSON,
(Nevada) 375 P.2d 591; "B" v. "B", App.Div.2d 160, 385 N.Y.S.2d 821;
RE: ADOPTION OF NUTTLE, 24 Misc.2d 588, 208 N.Y.S.2d 271; RE: ADOPTION
OF ANONYMOUS, 39 Misc.2d 235, 240 N.Y.S.2d 235; RE: ADOPTION OF N.,
78 Misc.2dl05, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956; RE: ADOPTION OF JECONO, 462 Pa. 98,
231 A.2d 295.
Appellant relies heavily in his brief on ROBERTSON v.
HUTCHINSON, 560 P.2d 1110 (1977).

The Court should note some substantial

factual differences between ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON and the instant
case.

In ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON, the children were legitimate child-

ren of a marriage between Mr. ROBERTSON and Mrs. HUTCHINSON.

Mrs.

HUTCHINSON had been seriously injured in 1971 and was hospitalized
outside of the State of Utah.

In that case, Mrs. HUTCHINSON was deter-

mined not to have abandoned her children.

In the present case, Mr.

COX was outside of the State of Utah by his own choosing, seeking to
avoid prosecution for a crime which he admittedly committed.

Mr.

COX also was involved in an accident that occurred in the State of Utah
and was in the State of Utah after April, 1974, yet took no action
to visit the child or pay any support for him.

He filed no legal

document to provide for the support of the child, other than the acknowledgment of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics.

This

merely was acknowledgment that he iLtended, at some unknown time, to
do something for the child; but he took no affirmative action in
this
matter
theLibrary.
Petition
for
Adoption
filed.
Counsel
relies
Sponsored
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in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT; he "abandoned the child
and forfeited any rights that he may have had."
The standard which the Court followed in this lawsuit
is set out in

§

78-30-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows:

Adoption of deserted child.-A child deserted by its
parent or parents, and having no legal guardian, may be
adopted as in this chapter provided, without the consent
of the parent or parents having deserted said child,
when the district court in which the proceedings are
pending shall determine that such child has been deserted
by its parent or parents.
Notice of proceedings for the
determination of the fact of desertion shall be by
personal service, publication, or posting as the court
may direct and deem most likely to give notice to the
parent or parents, and the court may require such further notice of the proceedings to be given to the kindred of said child as may appear to be just and
practicable.

Our State Legislature, seeing that desertion is difficult to prove,
has amended that statute effective May 10, 1977, to read as
follows:

Consent unnecessary where parents fail to support or communicate with child.-A child may be adopted without the consent
of the parent or parents, when the district court in which
the proceedings are pending determines, after notice to such
parent or parents in a manner determined by the court, that
the parent or parents, having the ability and duty to do
so, have not provided support and have made no effort or
only token effort without good cause to maintain a parental
relationship with the child.
It is a rebuttable presumption
that no effort has been made if the parent or parents have
failed to support and communicate with the child for a period
of one year or longer.

Thus, the Legislature has amended the adoption statute to comply
with the judicial interpretions of other State Supreme Courts.
CLAUNCH v. ENTREKIN,

(Alabama) 128

See

S. 2d 100; LANKFORD v. HOLLINGS-
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540 P.2d 741; PETITION OF MARTINSON, (Colorado) 267 P.2d 658; KARKANEN
v. VALDESUSO, (Colorado) 515 P.2d 128; RE: ADOPTION OF LAYTON, (Florida)
196 S.2d 784; PETITION OF MILLER, 15 Ill.App.2d 333, 146 N.E.2d
226; RE: ADOPTION OF HERBST, 217 Kans. 164, 535 P.2d 437; RE: CARSON,
(Nevada) 375 P.2d 591; "B" v. "B", App.Div.2d 160, 385 N.Y.S.2d 821;
RE: ADOPTION OF NUTTLE, 24 Misc.2d 588, 208 N.Y.S.2d 271; RE: ADOPTION
OF ANONYMOUS, 39 Misc.2d 235, 240 N.Y.S.2d 235; RE: ADOPTION OF N.,
78 Misc.2dl05, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956; RE: ADOPTION OF JECONO, 462 Pa. 98,
231 A.2d 295.
Appellant relies heavily in his brief on ROBERTSON v.
HUTCHINSON, 560 P.2d 1110 (1977).

The Court should note some substantial

factual differences between ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON and the instant
case.

In ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON, the children were legitimate child-

ren of a marriage between Mr. ROBERTSON and Mrs. HUTCHINSON.

Mrs.

HUTCHINSON had been seriously injured in 1971 and was hospitalized
outside of the State of Utah.

In that case, Mrs. HUTCHINSON was deter-

mined not to have abandoned her children.

In the present case, Mr.

COX was outside of the State of Utah by his own choosing, seeking to
avoid prosecution for a crime which he admittedly committed.

Mr.

COX also was involved in an accident that occurred in the State of Utah
and was in the State of Utah after April, 1974, yet took no action
to visit the child or pay any support for him.

He filed no legal

document to provide for the support of the child, other than the acknowledgment of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics.

This

merely was acknowledgment that he iLtended, at some unknown time, to
do something for the child; but he took no affirmative action in
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heavily on the Appellant's poverty as a reason for not taking
affirmative action; yet Appellant is now, as he could have been
Salt Lake County Legal Services.

then, represented by

A parent's right or interest jn or to the custody
of an infant child is in the nature of a trust which imposes upon
him a reciprocal obligation to maintain, care for, and protect
the child; and the law secures him in this right so long as he
shall discharge the correlative duties and obligations and no
longer (emphasis added), 2 ArnJur 2d, Adoption,

§

29.

At no time

during the course of the lifetime of this minor child

has the

Appellant shown any interest in performing the obligations to
maintain, care '_,

•.'r

protect the minor child.

In fact, Mr. COX

totally has abbregated the trust reposed in him by the law; and his
parental rights, if any, were rightfully terminated by the Court
below.

As noted in 2 ArnJur 2d, Adoption, § 31, " ... (W)hen it is

satisfactorily established that the parent has

in fact

abandoned

or deserted the child the adoption may be allowed not only without
the consent of the parents but even against their opposition."
There has been, by this Appellant, a conscious disregard of the
obligations owed by a parent to a child.

See STATE IN INTEREST

OF SUMHERS CHILDREN v. WOLFFENSTEIN, 560 P2d 331 (1977).
In WOLFFENSTEIN, a father who had been found to have
abandoned his children by the Juvenile Court, appealed and the Utah
Supreme Court affCourt.

Jed the finding of abandonment by the Juvenile

In HOLFFENSTEIN, the Appelldnt was found to lwve abandoned

his children under

§

55-10-109 (l)b, Utah Code

~•notated,

1953;
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that "abandonment" should be interpreted and applied under

§

55-10-109 (l)b

just as the term "desert" has been interpreted under the adoption statute

§ 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

After reviewing IN RE ADOPTION OF

WALTON, 123 U. 380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953), the Court stated as follows:

Although we have not specifically defined abandonment under the Juvenile Court Act of 1965, we have
set forth evidence which sustained such a finding
in State in the Interest of A, 30 Utah 2d 131, 514
P.2d 797 (1973).
There, this Court noted the children
has spend a great part of their lives away from their
mother, who had shown very little interest in them
for two and one-half years.
The effort she put forth
to visit the children was nil. Her failure to manifest an interest in them after losing custody, and
to manifest a firm intention to resume physical
custody of her children for over a period of two
years was held sufficient to sustain a finding of
abandonment under 55-10-109(1) (b).
In D.M. v. State, Alaska, 515 P.2d 1234 (1973),
a termination proceeding, the appellant, as here,
urged a traditional definition of abandonment,
that it imports conduct on the part of the parent
which evidences a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental calims
to the child.
The standard urged would require
proof of an intent by the parent to relinquish all
claim to a natural child in order to dissolve the
normal legal relationship.
In contrast, the State
urged an objective standard, viz., appellant's
intent was properly inferred from the realities
of her conduct rather than from mere oral protestation.
We quote with approval the well-stated explanation
of the principle.
Whether or not there has been an
abandonment within the meaning of
the statute is to be determined
objectively, taking into account not
only the verbal expressions of the
natural parent but their conduct as
parents as well.
The subjective intent
standard often focuses too much attenon the
wishful
thoughts
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on the more important element of how
well the parents have discharged their
parental responsibility
While it may well be that a subjective intent is determinative when
dealing with abandonment of personal
property, over which the owner exercises an absolute property rights, we
believe that the relationship between
parent and child mandates an objective
standard of abandonment which looks to
the parent's obligations and rights as
well as to whether the natural bonds of
love and affection between parent and
child have been effectively dissolved
by reason of parental conduct.
A better definition of abandonment
for these purposes, is that abandonment
consists of conduct on the part of the
parent which implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent
to the child, leading to the destruction
of the parent-child relationship.
The Court cited as evidence to sustain the finding
of abandonment, the mother's failure to visit or communicate with the child for several years, her failure
to support the child in any way, either emotionally or
financially, together with be long term commitment of
the child to a foster home.
The Court concluded that
time and human nature had operated to dissolve the normal bonds between the child and his natural mother.
The aforecited objective test was refined in In Re
530 P.2d 747, 749 (1975), wherein the
court said the test focuses on two questions--Has the
parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for
his parental obligations, and has that disregard led
to the destruction of the parent-child relationship?

~-,Alaska,

The Utah Supreme Court, adopting the objective test set
forth by the Alaska Supreme Court, went on to sustain the lm,er
Court's

decision in holding that:

... the father's conduct demonstrated a conscious
disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to
a child, leading to the destruction of the parentchild
abandconmf'tll.
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Referring to the refined standard set forth in IN RE
~.,

supra, where the Court stated that the test focuses on two

questions: a) has the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for his parental obligations; and, b) has that disregard lead
to the destruction of the parent-child relationship.

In the present

case, the answer to the first question is clearly yes; and the second
question is moot as there has never been in existence a parent-child
relationship.

The only father that JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT knows, or

has ever known, is DEE R. MARSDEN.

With respect to the possibility

in an adoption proceeding of a conflict between a child

interest and

a parent's rights, the Utah Supreme Court, in WILSON v. PIERCE,
14 U.2d 317, 383 P2d 925, (1963), stated as follows:

The custody of this child being involved, a primary
concern is for her interest and welfare; and the rights
of contesting adults are secondary.

The Supreme Court affirmed this stand in STATE IN INTEREST OF A.,
30 U.2d 131, 514 P2d 97 (1973), when it stated while

... (O)ne feels deeply for a parent who is deprived
of a child, that feeling must not overcome the duty
placed upon the Courts to act in the best interest
of the child.

CONCLUSION

The District Court ruled properly that the Appellant, being
guilty of carnal knowledge, a near statutory rape, acquired no interest
in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT, and that, in the event he
did
acquire any rights, he forfeited the same by having abandoned the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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